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Over the past three decades, the rise of Islamist movements has turned on 
the political and social visions these movements have advocated. In scholarly 
analyses and media writings, explanations for this rise have tended to focus on the 
ideologies of Islamist groups, on the socio-economic backgrounds of Islamist 
actors, and on the political contexts for their emergence. More recently, research 
has turned to the wider processes of re-Islamization entailing social practices and 
disciplines that constitute individuals as Muslim selves active in the public sphere. 
These selves do not necessarily endorse the Islamist project of the Islamic state, 
nor do they perforce advocate militant or violent action to actualize a program of 
reforming the self and the social body of which they are members. However, the 
engagement of individual and collective projects of self-transformation in matters 
of ethics and morality has a bearing on the public sphere and on public space. As 
such, these projects engage others who may have varying, competing and 
conflicting projects. In the context of secular and western societies, they disrupt 
and destabilize modes of thinking and ways of being long thought to be the 
subject of consensus and closure. In Muslim-majority countries, the construction 
of Muslim public selves interrogates the project of modernity modelled after the 
western experience, while proposing alternative visions of the public sphere. 
In this essay I begin by reflecting on the varying constructions of Muslim 
subjects in the public sphere and, in particular, on how different projects of self 
are guided by varying understandings of religion and personal faith. My purpose 
is to draw out some of the political implications of individual projects of self 
grounded in religion, underscoring that we cannot isolate moral selves from 
political selves. In exploring the political implications of Muslim projects of self, 
I will engage with current debates on the nature of the public sphere and, in 
particular, the claim made about its neutrality. In this respect, I want to address 
the implications of adopting a critical questioning on the neutrality of the public 
sphere in terms of the subjectivities inhabiting it, and in terms of the signs and 
symbols that populate it. In questioning this presumed neutrality, I highlight the 
historical situatedness of the visibility or invisibility of Islamic markers in the 
public sphere. Following from that, I sketch elements of the refiguring of the 
public sphere and the reshaping of Islamic traditions under conditions of 
globalization. Finally, I turn to an examination of the local dynamics of power 
and contestation underpinning projects of self-presentation in the public sphere.  
My overriding argument is that projects of the Muslim self, like all such projects, 
take shape in context and in relation to material conditions, and are, further, 
enmeshed in power relations. They are never apolitical even when framed or 
explained in strictly moral or pietistic terms. Thus, projects of Muslim self-
production should not be seen as divorced from the settings and contexts in which 
they take place, but as imbricated in and emergent from those settings. 
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Islamism, Re-Islamization and the Construction of Muslim Selves 
 
The various projects of self that are pursued by contemporary Muslims are tied up 
with Islamist politics and the ongoing processes of re-Islamization.  Before 
proceeding further, I will briefly define what I mean by Islamist politics and re-
Islamization. I use Islamist politics to refer to activities of organizations and 
movements that mobilise and agitate in the political sphere while deploying signs 
and symbols from Islamic traditions. I use re-Islamization to designate the 
processes whereby various domains of social life are invested with signs and 
symbols associated with Islamic cultural traditions (Ismail 2003, 2). I have argued 
elsewhere that Islamist politics and re-Islamization are not mutually exclusive 
(Ismail 2003). Rather, they have points of both convergence and divergence. I 
also think that the forms of activism that both entail fall under the wider rubric of 
Islamism.   
At the ideological level, there is a wide range of articulations constituting 
the discursive field of Islamism. These articulations are neither coherent nor 
homogeneous. For example, they do not all necessarily buttress the idea of an 
Islamic state. Further, this field does not have fixed boundaries but rather overlaps 
with popular articulations of religion, more generally, and with differing 
productions of Muslim identities. Popular preachers, sheikhs associated with 
official Islam, religious figures of moderate Islam, lay religious intellectuals, 
Islamist activists, and ordinary Muslims all engage in the production of Muslim 
and Islamist identities. They are all party to the processes of re-Islamization. We 
do not have a straightforward equation for organising the manner in which this 
discursive field shapes Islamist movements. While it is safe to argue that re-
Islamization does not equate with Islamist politics, it is simplistic to see in re-
Islamization a negation of Islamism. There are stakes in the competing 
interpretative frames. Simply put, diverse actors, from secularists to militant 
Islamists, aim to claim ownership of “true Islam”. At this stage, we do not have a 
comprehensive view of the various discourses and their interaction (Ismail 2004a, 
398-99).  
For the purposes of this discussion, I want to focus on the individual level 
of engagement in the production of Muslim and Islamist identities, paying 
particular attention to projects of self and the kind of politics that they represent. 
Some projects of self make clearly-stated political claims, while others renounce 
and reject an explicit political stance. While I accept this distinction, inasmuch as 
the agents themselves make it, I argue that there may be different kinds of politics 
at play and therefore projects of self are almost always, in some sense, political. 
As will be elaborated below, in most cases, projects of self-reform are tied up 
with projects of societal reform and transformation. For example, proceeding 
from the individual level, they may aim to alter gender relations, family norms 
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and modes of conduct in public. The drive for re-Islamization in these areas does 
not necessarily operate in the narrow political sphere nor does it address questions 
of government and state. In light of this, we should be attuned to the different 
politics expressed in individual and collective projects of self and society. 
To illustrate, let us look at the examples of two Muslim women activists 
and their constructions of Islam and of their Muslim identity. I begin by 
considering the views of a well-known activist, writer and professor of Political 
Science at Cairo University, Heba Raouf. Raouf’s political vision is captured in 
her approach to the shari’a as a political ideology and her view that religion has 
an emancipatory role to play in society (see Qureshi and Raouf 2004). This 
premise appears to guide Raouf’s approach to social, cultural and religious 
practices of self-presentation in the public space. In her discourse, Raouf is 
critical of what she calls al-muhajjaba al-mutaharira (the liberal, veiled woman). 
Under this rubric, Raouf has in mind a muhajjaba (veiled woman) who wears a 
pure silk veil and speaks to her children in English (Haenni & Füger 1996, 121). 
The critique of certain forms of Muslim public self-presentation made by Raouf 
cannot be said to issue from any religious strictures in Islamic traditions.1 Rather, 
it is an improvisation necessary for the evaluation of proper adherence to a 
political project that, in the terms enunciated, has nationalist and cultural 
overtones, expressing the desire to draw distinctions from “the Other” through 
styles of dress, language and overall cultural self-construction and positioning.2 
I pose, in contrast to Raouf, Mrs. H., an activist who volunteers for an 
Islamic charitable association in Cairo, namely al-Jam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya. Mrs. H. 
holds a doctorate in the natural sciences and is engaged in fundraising for poverty 
relief, sponsorship of orphans, religious preaching and Quranic teaching. In 
discussing her activism, Mrs. H. rejected any reading of her engagement in 
political terms (interview with author, Cairo, April 2004). She explained that her 
activities in the charitable organization expressed a personal desire to please God: 
li-wajh allah (literally, “for God’s face”). She denied that she was guided by a 
sense of social responsibility or that she was motivated by a desire to assume an 
“alternative moral citizenship” (as one analyst has suggested).3 To prove the 
                                                 
1 However, it should be noted that it is possible to mine the traditions to find religious justification 
for the kind of position taken by Raouf. Indeed, Saudi scholars issued fatwa-s disallowing Muslim 
women from wearing jeans on the basis that they make them look like infidels (the reference, here, 
being to westerners). See Al-Rasheed 2007, 132. This is not the ground on which Raouf stands. 
2 The ‘Other’ from whom it is necessary to draw distinctions is invariably the west. While certain 
Islamist discourses construct the relations with this other in predominately cultural terms, a clear 
link between cultural, economic and political antagonisms is articulated in the contestatory 
discourses of some Islamist preachers and ideologues. An excellent example is the sermons of 
Safar al-Hawli and Salman al-Awda discussed in Mamoun Fandy (1999). 
3 The idea that engagement in the charity work of organizations like al-Jama‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya 
expresses an alternative form of citizenship is put forward by Sarah BenNefissa (2004).  The 
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strictly religious nature of her engagement, Mrs. H. invoked her apprenticeship in 
the ritual of washing the body of a deceased person. She explained that she learnt 
the ritual because it was recommended by the Prophet and because its rewards in 
the afterlife were high. In her view, she was undertaking practices that would 
make her a better believer. Is Mrs. H.’s piety private? I venture to answer in the 
negative. No, her piety is publicly practised and asserted. Though she denies 
having any political project, her ethic of self or project of Muslim self is socially 
imbricated. What are the political implications of this? 
Mrs. H.’s rendering of her engagement in terms of a particular ethic of 
religious self-formation finds parallels in the terms used by Cairene women in 
mosque piety circles studied by Saba Mahmood (2003). Mosque circles are 
concerned with teaching scriptures, social practices and forms of conduct that are 
“considered germane to the cultivation of the ideal virtuous self” (Mahmood 
2003, 840). Examining the statements of these women allows me to draw out 
some of the political implications of ethical self-formation I am concerned with. 
As noted by Mahmood (2003, 842), in the construction and presentation of the 
ethical, virtuous self, the subject makes a distinction between practices that are 
conducive to the realization of the pious self and practices that are not. One of 
Mahmood’s informants goes further, identifying practices that are Islamic in form 
and style, but not in substance. There are a number of observations to be made 
here. First, the distinctions drawn by the subject with respect to Islamic practices 
are internal to the discourse. They articulate claims to knowledge and truth and, 
therefore, are not neutral. The evaluations and judgements made in these 
distinctions implicate others as bad practitioners or non-practitioners. Such 
judgements can carry weight beyond the statements made. We may ask what 
impact such evaluative statements have on the individuals whose conformity to 
certain understandings or interpretations of religious rules and practices are put 
into question. The pronouncements issued in this regard go beyond simple 
disagreements in a context where authoritative judgments of non-conformity may 
translate into exclusion from the community or, in extreme cases, may be used to 
justify violence. 
Second, the discourse expresses a link between a project of self and a 
project of society that we find in many of the piety movements. In her work on 
Moroccan women’s pietist groups, Christiansen (2003) crystallises the link 
between individual self-reform through pious practices and activism aimed at 
transforming society as evidenced by practices targeting others, such as teaching 
and counselling. From this perspective, we are dealing with political projects. The 
political, here, has many dimensions. My main argument is that we cannot isolate 
the moral selves from the political selves. The project of re-Islamization should 
                                                                                                                                     
articulation of the idea of social responsibility as integral to practices of public piety is also 
expressed by Shi‘i women active in religious charitable organizations in Lebanon (Deeb 2006).  
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not be constructed as apolitical because of its social and cultural orientation (as 
argued by Olivier Roy (1999) for instance). As noted above, transforming gender 
relations and family norms are ultimately political manoeuvres. Further, re-
Islamization and Islamist politics converge and diverge and there is no benefit to 
be gained from seeing them as contradictory forces. A practical example of the 
convergence emerges when we consider the links between pietist groups and 
militant organizations. At a basic level, there is a shared discursive ground— both 
draw on a common stock of religious texts and articulate similar positions on 
issues of gender relations and family norms. In addition, there is the question of 
the passage from membership in a pietist group to membership in a militant one 
(see Ismail 2004a & 2006). 
There is a broad range of normative and political issues that arise in 
relation to religious practices shaping the self and its public presentation. To a 
large extent, the debate has focused on the question of the freedom and autonomy 
of the subjects engaged in Islamic practices. In her work with mosque-circle 
women, Mahmood poses the following question: Are these women cultivating a 
certain Muslim self through practices that are socially prescribed, free and 
autonomous or not (Mahmood 2003)?4 In asking this question, Mahmood aims to 
challenge liberal and feminist conceptions of agency and freedom, arguing that 
socially derived models of self do not negate the subject’s historical agency. The 
political implications that I am concerned with are somewhat different. They turn 
on the kind of citizen positions these Muslim selves occupy in relation to others 
and how others position themselves vis-à-vis these selves. The subject cultivated 
through practices - whether religious or profane - is an active subject, a member 
of a community or communities. Her project of self has a bearing on her co-
citizens, in the sense that the attitudes and dispositions that she cultivates orient 
her interaction with others and are likely to be manifested in practices of 
sociability, in evaluative assessments of others’ conduct and in the approach 
adopted to difference in belief and practice. It follows that the ethical formation of 
the individual as a public self has a bearing on the public sphere and public space. 
What we need to consider at this point then is how the public sphere, as 
conventionally conceived and structured, problematises subjects whose public 
self-presentation is grounded in religious discourses and practices. 
In conceiving the public sphere as an intermediate space in which citizens 
are formed and acquire capacities and skills that enable them as actors in the 
                                                 
4 Mahmood’s questions emerge in the context of her engagement with liberal feminist writers who 
posit freedom as contingent on the subject’s capacity to articulate moral and ethical preferences 
independent of societal rules. The issue we need to consider here is not where the values and 
ethical principles spring from (whether from self or society). Rather, if we suspend this dichotomy 
and accept Foucault’s argument that in constructing the self, the subject draws on models available 
in the social world, the question that arises concerns the models upon which the self is patterned. 
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political sphere, and in which apprenticeship in the practices of civility become 
foundational for political society, modern political thought put forward the idea 
that religion should be left out of the public sphere in order to establish and 
maintain a democratic polity. One of the key arguments put forward against 
bringing religiously derived values into the public sphere rests on the idea that the 
public sphere is a neutral space and that individuals/subjects come to it unmarked, 
that is, unburdened by their social positioning, having somehow shed the 
accoutrements of their social being—the most important of which are gender, 
class and religion. In this respect, it would seem that the Muslim and Islamist 
projects of self are the ones that get closer scrutiny by a supposed neutral public 
subject, who, because of this presumed neutrality, feels comfortable or at ease in 
not just critiquing them, but in disqualifying them.5 This may be done in the name 
of defending women’s rights, individualism, democracy, ‘our values’, ‘the things 
we stand for’ and so on. Underlying all of this is a claim to universalism and 
superiority in normative terms, a claim to having a better vision of society and the 
position of the individual in it. In order to put these premises into question, it is 
important that we assess critically the claimed neutrality of the public sphere. In 
the next section, I present a critical discussion on the notion of neutrality in the 
public sphere focusing on how the secular public sphere operates by 
marginalizing forms of Islamic self-presentation in public. This detour is 
necessary in order to proceed, in the subsequent section, to an account of the 
transformations in the public sphere arising in conjunction with particular forms 
of Muslim public self-presentation. The last section suggests the terms of a 
reformulation of the problematique of contemporary Muslim public self-
presentation and interventions, one that takes into account the relations of power 
in which they are imbricated and the kind of politics they represent. 
 
Muslim Selves, Modernity and the Public Sphere 
 
Drawing on Nilüfer Göle (2002), I want to underline the idea that public self-
presentation takes place in context, in particular places with histories. Göle 
suggests that by scrutinizing how Islamic practices are “… problematized in the 
public sphere, we become aware of the unspoken, implicit borders and the 
                                                 
5 This scrutiny has taken many forms. The media, public bodies and state-sponsored commissions 
in a number of West European countries have examined closely certain expressions of Muslim 
subjectivity to determine their compatibility with western liberal norms and models of the subject 
(an insightful look at this type of exercise is found in Asad 2006). The gaze in this evaluative 
exercise is cast beyond western borders to Muslim-majority countries. Additionally, an internal 
self-scrutiny is conducted by reform and secular intellectuals and activists with the aim of 
evaluating Muslim practices and performances in light of the ideals of modernity. Interestingly, 
the same preoccupation guides the social and public work of some contemporary Islamist activists 
as well (Deeb 2006). 
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stigmatizing, exclusionary power structure of the secular public sphere” (2002, 
178). In other words, we need to pay attention to the techniques of power that 
serve to validate and authorise certain practices and ideas and not others. At issue 
are the rules of inclusion and exclusion from the public sphere. From this 
perspective, the “public sphere” represents not only the space or domain of debate 
and deliberation (the classical Habermasian understanding) but also a field of the 
construction of public subjects through techniques of marking, differentiation and 
identification. It is precisely because of the effects of power practices on the 
formation of subjects that the idea of the neutrality of the public sphere has been 
put into question. Critiques of Habermas’ conception of the public sphere argue 
that the construction of modern, rational subjectivities rests on the gendered 
distinctions of the public and private (Benhabib 1992; Fraser 1992). Based on 
these distinctions, the rational subject of the public sphere was presumed to be 
male, white and middle class (Warner 1992). This was the taken-for-granted, the 
self-evident that needed no justification.   The contention has been that in this 
sphere, impartial reason stands above and against differentiated moral subjects. 
However, this normativity is accomplished precisely by exclusion, stigmatization 
and repulsion of subjectivities falling outside its confines (the female, poor, non-
white, religious subjectivities).   
Elaborating on this critique Alev Çinar (2005, 40) points out that the 
public sphere is constructed not only through debate and deliberation, but also 
through visual displays and performances of subjectivities. In this respect, the 
production of identity and difference is an ongoing process that entails power and 
resistance and, as such, it is not fixed and does not achieve closure. The manner in 
which signs and symbols of identity are produced and circulated expresses power 
and contestation. Naming, marking and identifying are means through which 
subject positions of privilege and under-privilege are demarcated. For example, an 
item of clothing, a style of speech or a territorial association could enter into the 
identification of a subject in particular terms— as Islamist or secular, as 
progressive, conservative or liberal, as belonging to a particular class and so on 
(see Çinar 2005, 41-2). An examination of the processes of identity formation in 
the public sphere helps inform us of the inclusionary and exclusionary practices at 
work. It is important to pay attention to the fact that the dynamics of identity and 
difference in the secular public sphere play out in terms of ‘neutral’ unmarked 
subjectivities and identities: the taken-for-granted public subject and those who 
stand out because they bear signs of difference from the neutral, public subject. 
Questioning this presumed neutrality has a bearing not only on our 
understanding of western public spheres, but also on how we view the 
development of the public sphere in non-western settings. We need to keep in 
mind that this development was informed by the projection of the west as a model 
and by the production of western modernity as a master narrative whose linearity 
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and teleology was presumed to capture the spirit of progress. To the extent that 
projects of modernity bore the emulative stamp, the western model of the public 
sphere - with its presumed neutrality - tickled the imagination of the intellectual 
and cultural elites spearheading modernization in those countries where catching 
up was the driving objective of transformative projects. 
If we consider the development of the secular public sphere in Turkey, 
Iran and Egypt, we find that the banishment of certain signs and markers - like the 
veil - was enacted as a form of a secularising and modernising rite of passage. As 
Göle (2002, 184) argues, women became a ‘sign/site’ in the construction and 
projection of the public sphere. In the same vein, forced unveiling in Iran in the 
early part of the twentieth century, as pointed out by Minoo Moallem (2005, 69), 
constituted ‘a corporeal inscription of modern citizenship’. Following a similar 
logic, the taking-off of the veil by Huda Sha΄rawi (Egypt’s pioneer leader of the 
women’s movement in the early-twentieth century) upon her return from Europe, 
was one of those performative acts marking the passage or entry of Egypt into the 
space and time of modernity. Later in the twentieth century, forced veiling in Iran 
would come to punctuate another moment of state intervention in the perpetuation 
of particular forms of femininity (Moallem 2005, 70). In contrast, in Turkey and 
Egypt, the propagation of veiling and the various modalities of its adoption have 
served to remap old and new subjectivities in the public sphere.  
Imbued with the meanings invested through secular practices, the veil 
appeared as the sign of backwardness, a regression in the civilizing process with 
its associated styles of dress. The social imaginary that articulates these views and 
projects them into the public gaze, then, necessitates banishment and exclusion.6 
Through a particular historical construction, the unveiled woman was an 
affirmation of the modern self. The invisibility – or absence - of signs of 
Islamicity was evidence of a modernizing society, indeed, of a civilizing one. To 
this day, many secular Egyptians point to videotapes of Um Kulthum concerts in 
the 1960s as the proof that Egypt was progressing: “Not a single veiled woman in 
the audience,” they observe. “Rather, all were elegantly dressed in fashionable 
evening wear following the latest western trends.” 
The public performance of modernity was on display not only nationally 
but also internationally since the staging of the ‘civilized self’ targeted the West 
as the model and ultimate reference. In a poignant reflection on her journey to 
America in the 1960s (in the film Four Women of Egypt by filmmaker Tahani 
Rached), Safinaz Kazem, a contemporary Islamic writer and literary critic, and a 
former Marxist, notes how she engaged in outbidding her western interlocutors 
regarding the modernity of Egypt in matters of personal ethics and morality. To 
                                                 
6 Such was the case with the Turkish Parliamentarian who, in 1999, was run out of Parliament 
before she could give her oath of allegiance because she wore a veil on the day of her swearing-in 
ceremony (Göle 2002). 
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win Egypt the credentials of a modern nation, she asserted to her interlocutors that 
Egyptian women wore short skirts and, on matters of gender-mixing, were as 
liberals as their American counterparts, if not more. This public self was thought 
of as the ticket to modernity. We do not need to go over what has unfolded 
between the drive to emulate and the drive to authenticate in Safinaz Kazem’s 
personal journey or in the wider public transformation of Muslim women and men 
in which the adoption of certain practices and not others and the rendering of 
personal and collective ethics became grounded in Islamic idioms. My interest 
here is to think out the issues with which we are confronted in and by Islamic self-
presentation in public. 
If we accept that public self-presentation is not neutral, that in the 
production of public selves, subjects draw on existing models and ideas and 
engage in self-disciplines that are historically and socially grounded, then we 
should examine what it is about the contemporary Muslim projects of self that is 
seen as problematic. To put the question in vernacular terms, what difference does 
it make whether one’s public self-presentation is informed by images and ideas 
proffered on American daytime television shows such as Oprah or garnered 
listening to popular preachers like Amr Khaled? We need to be cognizant of the 
multiplicity of sources of the self, and that it is difficult to find - except for the 
most insular beings - selves that are formed in relation to one source only. In 
many instances, the sources and models for self-construction may appear as 
contradictory.7 The question to be posed, then, is on what basis can religiously 
constituted markers of identity and forms of religious self-presentation be 
excluded or marginalized in the public sphere? Classical secular liberal arguments 
invoke the risks of intolerance towards difference that religion in public would 
bring about. They also view secular reason as neutral, hence normatively superior 
to religious reason, making it accessible to citizens of different doctrinal 
persuasions. Revisionist liberals concede the right of individuals to bring religious 
reasons to the public sphere, but add provisos for regulating their ability to do so.8 
Without wishing to deny the merits of this debate, I am more interested in shifting 
the analysis to consider the relations of power in which religiously grounded 
practices of self are imbricated. But before doing so, I will outline aspects of the 
refiguring of the public sphere resulting from Muslim public interventions and 
self-presentation. 
 
                                                 
7 Egyptian observers have noted the duality of preacher Amr Khaled and singer Amr Diyab as 
models for young Egyptians and Arabs. Rather than being contradictory, the preacher and the 
singer inhabit one another not as a schizoid self but as a weave of synchronic multiplicity. 
8 Habermas’ (2005) recent reformulation of the place of religion in the public sphere aligns with 
revisionist liberal thinking, providing new terms for inclusion of religious reasons in public debate 
and outlining conditions for engagement among citizens both secular and religious. 
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Refiguring the Public Sphere: An Islamic Public Re-Emergent? 
 
Muslim public self-presentation signals a change in the ideas structuring public 
discourse and in the practices and disciplines through which public subjectivities 
are formed and assumed. Specifically, these interventions shift the terms of public 
debate away from nationalist politics and secular conceptions of the project of 
modernization, proposing a redefinition of the community, its governing norms 
and its civilizational project (Salvatore 1998, 109).  In considering this more 
recent re-entry of religion into the public sphere, it is necessary to take into 
account a number of socio-historical developments and their implications for 
reshaping Islamic traditions. Modernity and globalization define the historical 
context and processes that inform the production of Muslim selves. In this respect, 
some scholars assert that religious and cultural meanings are being reshaped by 
the forces of globalization, forces that promote hybridity and increased 
permeability of cultures and traditions (Hefner 1998). In examining the 
contemporary Muslim production of self, Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori 
(1996) identified the process of objectification as a driving force reshaping 
Islamic traditions by altering the conditions of gaining religious knowledge and 
claiming authority. They argue that Muslims’ self-quest for a sense of what it 
means to be Muslim has come about as a result of modernizing developments, in 
particular education and the spread of literacy. A related development was the 
weakening of the power of traditional religious authority and the rise of new bases 
and forms of religious authority.   
These developments should be situated in relation to the transformations 
inaugurated by the earlier projects of modernization and the associated processes 
of state-building. The diversification and multiplication of religious authorities 
witnessed today has emerged against the background of state-sponsored 
centralization and incorporation of religious institutions as part and parcel of the 
processes of modernization. With the assertion of state control over key religious 
institutions came a drive for harmonization of religious discourses and practices 
with the project of modernity (see Gasper 2001; Salvatore 2001).  Further, in 
subscribing to this project, segments of the religious establishment served not 
only to confer religious legitimacy on state policies, but to reorient practices and 
modes of reasoning to cohere with the desired new social order (Gasper 2001; 
Starrett 1998). The Islamic reformist movement of the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries aimed at a remake of society through moral and social reform 
that was consonant with the ideas of progress and development at the time. 
Michael Gasper (2001, 85) argues that at the heart of this enterprise was the 
construction of subjects who conducted themselves in conformity with the 
prevailing civilizational vision. This has meant that Islamic reformers, not unlike 
their secular compatriots, have had to accede to modes of reasoning and 
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rationalities and techniques of power embedded in the western narrative of 
modernity (Salvatore 2001, 11; Gasper 2001). It followed that their interventions 
in the public sphere were part of a reordering in regimes of truth and power that 
privileged scientific discourse and principles over traditional religious knowledge 
and its style of argumentation and discussion (Gasper 2001, 88).   
An important dimension of the state-sponsored modernization has been a 
redrawing of the boundaries of the public and private. At times, this has entailed 
bringing into the public, and under the remit of state agencies, matters previously 
privately regulated. This means that the public-private distinction is a function of 
the boundaries drawn up by state and non-state actors in and through their 
interaction and in relation to particular socio-historical contexts.  
The shift in the boundaries of the public and private has brought about 
contestations over authority and the power to regulate the public sphere. In this 
respect, contemporary Muslim religious authorities and Islamists claim that 
whenever the private becomes public, it becomes subject to religiously-inspired 
regulation (see Kadivar 2003). Central to these kinds of contestations and 
contentions over the public and private is a certain ambiguity regarding what falls 
into realms requiring public reason and intersubjective agreement and what may 
be better left up to individuals and groups as matters of taste or aesthetics. The 
difficulty here is that while not all matters in public require public reasons, the 
attempt or desire of some citizens to bring about collective regulation on certain 
matters necessitates that reasons be given, that deliberation ensues and that a 
consensus on the form of regulation be reached. 
As such, the construction of Muslim public selves is dialogic, that is, it is 
undertaken in dialogue among Muslims and with non-Muslims. The dialogue 
pertains to what it means to be Muslim and what conditions make it possible to 
lead a life consonant with that identity. At the same time, with a degree of 
individualization, we have a proliferation of the ways and signs of imagining the 
Muslim self in public— proliferating, in a sense, the selves in dialogue. Today, 
we find a wide range of representations of Muslim subjectivities in cultural 
products such as film, novels, fashion and music.  While personal quests for what 
it means to be Muslim entail a degree of individualization, their driving 
motivation is a search for coherence and stable meanings and norms that are core 
to a ‘true’ Islam, capturing its unchanged essence. In surveying the signs of these 
multiple quests, the observer is thus confronted by the operation of two seemingly 
contradictory impulses. On one hand, we find personal quests and accompanying 
individualization that find expression in a pluralization of the languages and 
registers of being Muslim (a heteroglossia of sorts, to use Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
(1981) term). On the other, the desire to identify a fixed Islam fuels 
homogenization efforts (monologisation in Bakhtin’s terms). The objective of 
such efforts, as noted by Jonathan Berkey (2007, 50), is to replace the 
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polyvocality of Islamic traditions with a univocal understanding of Islam. We see 
this at work in the deployment of the grid of halal (licit) and haram (illicit) to rule 
on and classify an ever-increasing range of practices, ideas and representations in 
public. From hisba episodes to fatwa banks on-line, the objective is to regulate 
and discipline Muslim conduct in public in a uniform manner consistent with the 
idea of a unified and unitary Islam. 
Thus, Islam as a discursive tradition is subject to homogenizing forces 
driving for the unity of meaning and to pluralizing forces seeking plurality of 
languages and asserting difference. As noted, we see these forces at work in the 
multiplication of religious authorities and in the concomitant efforts to 
homogenize sources of authority and reference.9 It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to map out the stratification of the languages of Islam and the various 
registers through which they develop and the sites of their articulation. However, 
it is important that I highlight certain features of the dynamics of pluralization and 
homogenization and provide some preliminary reflections on their implications 
for Muslim polities and societies. 
The public dialogues about Islamic practices are plural and layered. The 
dialogues also develop in relation to events taking place in specific localities, but 
through globalized means of communication they acquire a global import. At the 
same time, there is an interplay of the dynamics of globalization and localization 
in the dialogues taking place among Muslims and between Muslims and non-
Muslims. Not only do local events and experiences refer to trans-locally 
elaborated discourses as shown by Bowen (2004), but in many instances they 
trigger trans-local debates and interventions that are intended to generate a 
univocal understanding of tradition. Events and developments in one locality 
become pretexts for a trans-local inquiry into the Islamic norms and rules on a 
given act, conduct or statement.10  For example, on the al-Jazeera satellite 
channel, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi responds to questions not only raised by 
devout Muslims seeking further personal enlightenment in matters of ritual 
practice or doctrine, but also thrown up by challenges to Islamic “orthodoxy” 
taking place in the far-flung corners of the imaginary umma. As such, he was 
called upon to formulate a position on the permissibility of women leading the 
Friday prayer, an issue thrown into the open when Professor Amina Wadud did 
just that and in response some Muslims issued a condemnation. In the same vein, 
Dr. Muhammad Habash - a self-declared member of the enlightened trend in 
Islamic thought - was faced with worshipers posing the same question during his 
Friday commentary that follows the prayer at al-Zahra’ mosque in Damascus. 
                                                 
9 For a discussion of the dynamics of homogenization and fragmentation in contemporary Islamic 
discourses and practices from a comparative perspective see Hefner 1998. 
10 An excellent illustration of this trans-local search for authoritative Islamic rulings is provided in 
Caeiro’s (2004) study of fatwas on bank interest and home mortgages in western settings.  
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Qaradawi, Habash and the myriad of religious scholars-cum-preachers proffer 
their responses and fatwa-s in a global context structured by the ideas of a 
confrontation between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’. In other words, a global geo-
politics (conceived in terms of confrontation) represents an additional frame for 
interpretation and self-positioning.  
The reshaping of Islamic traditions in response to the processes of 
objectification and individualization and as a result of both the drive for 
homogenization and the pressures of fragmentation has centred on the ethical 
resources that Muslims call upon in their daily lives. The discourses propagated 
through various media from cassette sermons, instruction manuals and pamphlets, 
to satellite television shows and internet sites are geared to inform Muslims about 
the correct manner of performing rituals (in Islamic jurisprudence, the field of 
‘ibadat). Additionally, they seek to instruct Muslims on how to conduct 
themselves in a manner consonant with Islam in their daily lives (in Islamic 
jurisprudence, the field of mu‘amalat, literally transactions). In other words, they 
aim to orient individual conduct and social interaction in terms that invoke 
Islamic rules and norms. This objective has required an extension of the domains 
of fatwa-seeking and fatwa-giving and the sites of their articulation. The same 
objective has also been sought through an expanded sphere of religious 
instruction on chat shows, lessons at homes and in mosques, and data-banks and 
on-line sites. The pedagogies of Islamic virtue and the Muslim’s engagement in 
learning and practicing them go beyond the individual level as they seek to 
govern modes of social interaction and to regulate much of what goes on in the 
public domain. 
In this refiguring of the public sphere and out of the reshaped traditions, 
particular patterns emerge for shaping Muslims as public subjects who, to use 
Armando Salvatore’s (2001, 40) formulation, are “carriers of the dialogic and 
disciplining instruments of public reason”. In this respect, Charles Hirschkind 
(2001) points out that an Islamic ‘counter-public’ is formed through deliberative 
and disciplinary practices developed around listening to cassette-sermons. As 
sermon listening trains both reason and affect, Muslim listeners acquire skills and 
competencies that are necessary to enter into debate with one another on the 
interpretation of Islamic sources and on correct practices. For example, they learn 
styles of Islamic argumentation, a skill that allows them to draw on traditional 
sources in addressing contemporary concerns and issues. Yet, this counter-public 
which, according to Hirschkind, emerges at a distance from the state articulates a 
project of societal reform that seeks to ensure conformity of individual conduct 
with divinely guided morality (Hirschkind 2001, 27). In this sense, Islamic 
pedagogies reorient the terms in which the Muslim self is formed.  
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In this reorientation, practices are geared towards the disciplining of Muslims as 
subjects who regulate their conduct in accordance with Islamic rules. This can be 
noted in the reactivation and accompanying expansion of fatwa in the 
management of ethical questions and in the grounding of public morality in 
reference to religious norms.11 One of the main features of re-Islamization has 
been the increased dependence on fatwa to address the ethics and propriety of 
quotidian transactions and relations in their details.12 This has required the resort 
to religious authorities, but has also encouraged the informalization of fatwa-
seeking and fatwa-giving. This development underscores the paradox of practices 
aimed at capturing divine intention as the principle of guidance in spheres of life 
where it is also regarded that common sense should not contradict with these 
same intentions. Much of the efforts of re-Islamization have been focused on 
grounding public morality in Islamic norms, with particular attention being paid 
to the sphere of gender interaction, women’s presence in public and the regulation 
of sexuality. The injunction of al-amr bil ma‘ruf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar (to 
command good and forbid evil) is invoked in this assumption of governance 
responsibilities on the part of Muslims acting individually or collectively to 
safeguard or restore the moral order in public.   
The signs of a re-emergent Islamic public sketched above have been 
subject to assessment in terms of whether this public ushers in a new era of 
                                                 
11 Another development that merits closer examination is the reassertion of an eschatological 
orientation in the articulation of the ethics of action in this world. Contemporary re-enactments of 
social practices grounded in the tradition can also be seen to represent an economy of individual 
and collective salvation that is developed around the reorientation of the ethics of action towards 
the hereafter. Reward and retribution calculations are made to choose and justify action, as in the 
statement made by Mrs. H to justify her apprenticeship in the ritual of washing the body of a 
deceased person. This economy is yet to be studied in a systematic fashion.  Sermons by preachers 
articulate a critique of the estrangement of Muslims from practising their religion and from 
seeking closer relations with the divine by deploying wa‘z (moral exhortation) on what awaits 
transgressors in the hereafter. A softer approach to the hereafter in the promotion of public piety is 
pursued by ‘liberal’ preachers like Amr Khaled. On the promotion of this eschatological approach 
to the ethics of worldly practices by preachers see Hirschkind 2007. 
12 According to Masud, Messick and Powers (1996, 29), although there appears to be a widening 
in the social scope of modern fatwa, the share of mu‘amalat (transactions) in collections of fatwa-s 
in the modern period declined because civil law regimes in many Muslim countries draw little on 
the shari‘a. However, I suggest that there are reasons to think that this may be changing. There 
may be an increase in the recourse to fatwa dealing with transactions as individuals redirect their 
activities to the informal sphere which is not regulated by the state and as such would have little 
use for civil law to regulate their interaction. This is certainly the case in the informal economy 
where much credit circulation and exchange is conducted without the benefit of formal financial 
regulations (see Ismail 2006). Thus, actors in this sphere replace the legal regime with conventions 
guided by Islamic ethics. A good example is the use of instalment payment in of selling and 
buying transactions. The propriety of raising the price with this type of transaction is judged 
within Islamic norms proffered in fatwa obtained formally and informally.   
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pluralism and toleration or foretells rising extremism and intolerance. Assessment 
is also carried out in terms of whether deliberation and persuasion or coercion and 
a measure of force are being used. Undoubtedly, these factors should be worked 
into any examination of the ongoing refiguring of the public sphere. I would 
suggest that this type of assessment cannot be carried out in the abstract and 
arrived at based on a priori assumptions about religious norms and practices. 
Rather, it is necessary that the practices forming the Muslim public self be 
examined in their socio-political context and in terms of their entanglement with 
relations of power and domination. In what follows, I look at the entanglement of 
male and female public piety in gendered relations of power that are shaped by 
the dynamics of contemporary socio-economic transformations and patterns of 
interaction with the state. 
 
Projects of Self and Power Relations 
 
Surveying the signs of the refiguring of religion under conditions of globalization, 
some scholars have argued that the transnationalization of spaces of religion has 
resulted in disembedding of religious meanings and norms from their national 
settings (Casanova 2001; Roy 2004); an untying of the link between the nation-
state and frames that inform individual identity, including those grounded in 
religion. I think that this formulation understates the extent to which the 
reworking of religious traditions is inscribed in social relations of power at the 
local level. In this section, I turn to what I see as dimensions of re-embedding of 
religious expressions in local settings and their imbrication in relations of power 
and domination, including relations with the state. 
Studies of specific forms of feminine religious public piety, such as the 
adoption of the veil, note that such practices discipline the self while also opening 
up spaces for resistance. It is also pointed out that wearing the veil is associated 
with modification in general conduct (thought of as reform). In principle, the 
adoption of the veil associates with modesty, regulated gender mixing and so on. 
Viewpoints critical of the wearing of the veil identify it as a practice that 
subjugates women because it defines them in limiting normative terms— as a 
sexualized presence, as sources of fitna (in this context used to mean seduction) to 
be controlled (we may say not different from the images of women found in 
fashion magazines though the ideals are different). However, the adoption of the 
veil as an expression of piety and adherence to particular moral norms is tied with 
other practices relating to religious observance (ilitzam) and with the acquisition 
of certain skills and capacities. In this sense, as noted by Mahmood (2005), these 
practices are enabling for women: going to the mosque and adhering to 
community norms permit the formation of a public self. Women who become 
learned in the sciences of interpretation and hadith-s acquire the tools to argue 
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different readings and to make claims for differently situated subjectivities. In 
doing so, they break the male monopoly over religious authority. However, for 
some women activists, empowerment is not the goal, but a means of achieving 
closeness to God and of becoming better persons (Hafez 2003; Deeb 2006).  
In taking account of women’s varied motivations in adopting the veil and 
becoming observant, we should inquire into how these practices are inserted into 
particular settings and how they acquire meaning and have effect in relation to 
other practices. Subject-forming processes are power laden. We are only able to 
see the power relations that underpin subject formation and subjectivities, if we 
situate them in their socio-historical context and take account of the complex 
interplay of what is at stake for individuals in subject formation. In this regard, we 
should recall Foucault’s (2003) proposition that practices of power may overlap, 
reinforce or annul one another. Therefore, what obtains at any given moment is a 
constellation or configuration of practices in interaction with one another. I want 
to zoom in on one of these constellations of practices to underscore the power 
relations that are at play in young men and women’s display of public piety in one 
setting, namely the low-income neighbourhoods of Cairo. 
In my work with youth in a popular quarter of Cairo, I found competing 
and conflicting programmes of self-fashioning that invoked patriarchal relations, 
class positions and relations to the state. Pious young men participated in religious 
fraternities of sorts (Ismail 2006). They joined groups like Al-Tabligh wa al-
Da‘wa and Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiya or study circles and Islamic musical 
bands. Through this engagement, they cultivated an ethic of Muslim self. They 
learnt about matters of religion and informed themselves of religious rulings, 
recommended conduct and so on. They sought self-discipline through extended 
prayers (tahajud), reading religious pamphlets, listening to sermons on audio-
cassettes and some of them ventured into the classics of the tradition. Further, 
they projected this Muslim self into their daily activities and chores. An important 
modification in practice and conduct was that of abstaining from ‘chatting idly to 
women’ and from shaking hands with them. This introduces a change in the 
existing norms of civility in the everyday life of alleyways in popular 
neighbourhoods of Cairo where gender mixing within the norms of propriety was 
accepted. The devout youth’s practices of self-discipline include lowering the 
gaze (ghad al-basar) as recommended in the Qur’an. Further, they take on the 
role of preachers to their mothers, sisters and female neighbours counselling the 
veil and admonishing immodest dress.  
It would be too limiting to read these young men’s practices in the sphere 
of gender relations, public morality and the management of sexuality only as part 
of a programme of piety that works on the inner self. To integrate the idea of 
social reform will broaden our view. Yet, we must also bring into view other 
dynamics. I interpret the practices as implicated in male efforts at recovering 
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positions of authority lost as a result of changing socio-economic and cultural 
conditions. For instance, the increased participation of women as workers in the 
public space undermines constructs of the masculine self as provider. Women’s 
own self-fashioning through education and work entails greater self-assertion. To 
further complicate the picture, young men occupy antagonistic positions in 
relation to state agents (Ismail 2006). In this conflictual and potentially 
confrontational situation, women have stepped in as mediators with state 
authority, a development which disrupts conventional constructions of 
masculinity. Male piety and civility is imbricated in this socio-political setting and 
cannot be understood outside it. 
My point is that religiosity and piety are informed by one’s social and 
political positioning. While they do not equate with militancy, or inevitably lead 
to activism, they are, nonetheless, political. However, we are dealing with a 
different kind of politics. In some sense, the pious male youth deploy disciplinary 
practices that reproduce the terms of dominant masculinity, monitoring and 
surveillance of women, construction of women as potential transgressors against 
the moral code, and so on. Women challenge these constructions by taking on 
employment outside the home, becoming visible in public space and articulating a 
different view of their roles in family and society. They may do so while also 
asserting their morality through forms of religious observance (ilitzam), including 
the adoption of the veil. 
The selves that are formed and shaped through personal and collective 
programmes of piety are deeply embedded in social relations. Class, gender, age 
and lifestyle are factors that influence the processes of formation of Muslim 
selves (Ismail 2004b). Projects of self bear the weight of history. Muslims as self-
fashioning agents do not stand outside history. They are not moved by something 
abstract called Islam, often projected as a puppeteer working behind the scenes 
moving Muslims to act in one way or another. Yes, Muslims reflect on their faith 
and on their lives in light of their understanding of their faith. They seek to use 
principles derived from Islamic traditions to guide them. However, they are 
touched by competing frames of reference and registers. Their ethical formation is 





Contemporary Muslims’ engagement in projects of self and in the production of 
Muslim identities must be understood in relation to the social and political factors 
shaping the positions they occupy in various settings.  Muslims, as social actors, 
occupy different positions in their social settings and in relation to local and 
global processes of change. Their projects of self and the subjectivities they 
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project in the public sphere are informed by their historical location at any given 
place and time. It follows that they do not engage, in a uniform manner, in the 
construction of Muslim selves. Nor do they produce a monolithic Muslim 
identity. By situating Muslims’ engagement in projects of self in relation to local 
material conditions and in relation to global processes, we can discern the power 
relations that underpin subject formation and public self-presentation. We also 
need to pay attention to the ongoing public dialogues that the visual displays and 
performances of Muslim and Islamist subjectivities bring to the public sphere. 
Around and within these displays and performances lie constellations of power 
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